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Overview
Developments in international climate policy over the past 
five years have broadened the scope of technology policy in 
contributing to mitigation goals. Beyond the traditional model of 
technology transfer, new efforts have sought to deepen the level 
of cooperation between countries in accelerating innovation. Some 
of this activity has occurred in a multilateral context with open 
participation, such as the coordinated research and development 
(R&D) goals set under the Mission Innovation initiative announced 
at COP21. Other forms of cooperation occur in limited-member 
“clubs,” such as the International Energy Agency’s Implementing 
Agreements. Finally, bilateral agreements for R&D collaboration 
have been started between many country pairs, for example the 
U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center and the U.S.-India Joint 
Clean Energy Research and Development Center.
International cooperation provides the opportunity to accelerate 
innovation while also broadening access to and deployment 
of new inventions. However, these efforts also face multiple 
roadblocks in implementation. Here we propose a set of five 
key principles to establish cooperative R&D arrangements. We 
believe following these principles will lead to the formation of 
cooperative R&D arrangements which will enjoy the advantages of 
collaboration while bypassing many of the potential barriers.
 
why COLLabOrate?
The primary objective for international collaboration in innovation 
is to provide access to knowledge spillovers and enhance the speed 
of cumulative innovation1 by broadening access to these spillovers. 
Countries possess very heterogeneous skills and resources needed 
for climate change innovation. This heterogeneity is rooted in 
differing scientific capacity and capacity to perform “innovation 
system functions,”2 differing patterns of industrial development, 
and historical investment in differing technology areas. 
Innovation in any technology area creates a global public good. 
Therefore, cooperation can create incentives for countries to 
increase their investment in innovation,3 as demonstrated by the 
Mission Innovation pledges. These incentives may prove critical 
in raising the overall level of global climate change innovation 
investment above its currently inadequate level.4,5 In addition, 
innovation collaboration may also be beneficial by enabling  
larger R&D projects that capitalize on economies of scale3 and 
reducing information asymmetries that cause inefficient or 
duplicative effort.
Access to technologies for climate mitigation, like other 
technologies that provide a global public good, is limited. This 
is because the interests of those who develop and control such 
technologies do not necessarily align with the interests of the 
beneficiaries who may lack the economic, political, or social  
capital to incentivize broader access.6 When innovation occurs  
in collaborative arrangements, access to technologies is likely to  
be shared among all partners. This broadens access to new 
inventions relative to unilateral R&D efforts, although it may not 
necessarily make the fruits of innovation fully accessible where 
technology is most needed. 
Despite their potential, in recent experience, collaborative R&D 
arrangements have fallen short. As relatively new institutional 
arrangements, collaborative R&D efforts have experimented 
with alternate modes of governance and management, but 
have struggled to overcome a lack of trust between countries. 
In particular, unfamiliarity with foreign laws and culture, little 
joint communication, and not fully understanding the intellectual 
property management for joint projects has hindered the 
performance of existing collaborative R&D arrangements.7–9
 
prinCipLes fOr COOperatiOn
Here we propose five key principles that can be used to design 
a successful cooperative organization that overcomes the main 
obstacles current cooperative R&D efforts experience. These key 
principles focus on implementing arrangements to increase the 
level of risk-taking in R&D, broaden participation by the private 
sector, and create stable win-win incentives for both parties to  
an agreement.
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Cooperation on the basis of Comparative advantage 
Cooperative agreements create the greatest benefits when they 
capitalize on the comparative advantages of participants. There 
are many dimensions of potential comparative advantage within 
cooperative R&D arrangements, including in research capacity, 
markets, and complementary infrastructure. Effective cooperative 
arrangements should seek to marry the complementary 
advantages of different countries. Cooperative arrangements 
should also consider existing participant country expertise in 
specific technology strains when selecting new R&D areas. 
Importantly, cooperative arrangements should seek to bring 
together researchers from different, localized backgrounds. 
Creating research teams with multiple perspectives are more  
likely to lead to  breakthroughs.10,11 
private sector engagement
In order for collaborative R&D arrangements to be effective, 
adoption of technologies in the domestic markets of participants 
should be given priority.12 A key strategy to accelerate 
commercialization and adoption of technologies in collaborative 
R&D efforts is to increase the participation of the private sector. 
Meaningful engagement of the private sector may require 
incentivizing participation by making technology benefits tangible, 
such as providing advance market commitments. Private sector 
engagement may also strengthen the political support needed to 
create a stable environment for long-term public investment and 
create the conditions needed for high-risk, high-reward R&D.13
practical implementation ingredients
Deep engagement between scientists from different countries is 
crucial to effectively deliver on the potential of collaborative R&D 
arrangements. Lessons from managing common-pool resources14 
apply to managing collaborative R&D arrangements: there should 
be frequent face-to-face communication, proper monitoring 
of project progress, and transparency in decision making and 
result sharing. Achieving these objectives may require in-depth 
negotiations on the specific design elements of a collaborative 
research center, see for example the process to develop the 
Technology Management Plan of the US-China Clean Energy 
Research Center.9
providing more authority to the scientists
When scientists have the authority to direct their research, higher-
risk, higher-reward research tends to be selected.15 When the 
authority for collaboration is placed on governments with little 
trust in collaboration, providing more authority to scientists could 
create a more trusting environment driven by scientists that share 
a common scientific culture. Collaboration between governments 
with low levels of trust should provide more authority to scientists 
to overcome this barrier to collaboration. 
Cooperating bilaterally
The potential for free-riding and non-compliance in existing 
cooperative R&D efforts is uncertain. Some countries may find the 
indirect costs of participation too high relative to the uncertain 
innovation outputs.12 These challenges are likely to be greater with 
a larger number of participating countries. Bilateral cooperation 
has the ability to narrow the complexities regarding cost-sharing 
and benefit-sharing while also enhancing the potential for 
creating a high-trust environment where knowledge can be 
freely exchanged. Based on the simplicity of bilateral agreements 
compared to plurilateral and multilateral arrangements, there 
is a greater potential to expedite innovation while avoiding the 
complexities that can arise in larger plurilateral or multilateral 
collaborative agreements.
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The views expressed in this brief are the views of the authors and not 
the University of Minnesota or the Center for Science, Technology, and 
Environmental Policy. We hope to contribute to the dialogue on developing a 
post-2020 international climate policy architecture and welcome all comments. 
a full paper discussing the ideas in this brief will be available soon. 
please contact gabechan@umn.edu for a copy.
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